Abstract-In wireless sensor networks, the q-composite key predistribution scheme is a widely recognized way to secure communications. Although connectivity properties of secure sensor networks with the q-composite scheme have been studied in the literature, few results address physical transmission constraints since it is challenging to analyze the network connectivity in consideration of both the q-composite scheme and transmission constraints together. These transmission constraints reflect real-world implementations of sensor networks in which two sensors have to be within a certain distance from each other to communicate. In this paper, we rigorously derive conditions for connectivity in sensor networks employing the q-composite scheme under transmission constraints. Furthermore, we extend the analysis to consider the unreliability of wireless links by modeling each link being independently active with some probability. Our results provide useful guidelines for designing securely and reliably connected sensor networks. We also present numerical experiments to confirm the analytical results.
I. INTRODUCTION
Random key predistribution schemes have been extensively studied in the literature for secure sensor networks [5] , [9] , [12] , [25] - [27] . Introduced in the seminal work of Eschenauer and Gligor [12] , the idea of random key predistribution has the following two steps: (i) before deployment, sensors are loaded with cryptographic keys selected in some random manner, and (ii) after deployment, for sensors that are close enough for communication and also happen to share some keys, they use the shared keys to generate link keys for secure communication.
Following the work [12] , Chan et al. [9] propose the qcomposite key predistribution scheme which has widely been recognized as an appropriate solution to secure communications in sensor networks (the paper [9] has been cited for more than 3,000 times as of late 2014). The q-composite scheme works as follows. For a sensor network with n nodes 1 , in the key predistribution phase, a large key pool consisting of P n cryptographic keys is used to select uniformly at random K n distinct keys for each sensor node. These K n keys constitute the key ring of a sensor, and are installed in the sensor's memory. After deployment, two sensors establish 1 Throughout the paper, the terms sensor and node are interchangeable. secure communication over an existing link if and only if their key rings have at least q keys in common. Both P n and K n are functions of n for generality, with the natural condition 1 ≤ q ≤ K n ≤ P n .
The q-composite scheme is an extension of the EschenauerGligor scheme [12] ; in the Eschenauer-Gligor scheme, a secure link between two sensors require the sharing of just one key, instead of q keys. In other words, the q-composite scheme with q = 1 reduces to the Eschenauer-Gligor scheme. Chan et al. [9] show that the q-composite scheme with q ≥ 2 outperforms the Eschenauer-Gligor scheme in terms of resilience to small-scale sensor capture attacks while trading off increased vulnerability in the presence of large-scale attacks. In both schemes, after sensors are deployed, common keys are found in the neighbor discovery phase whereby a random constant is enciphered in all keys of a node and broadcast along with the resulting ciphertext block in a given area limited by the transmission power/range; i.e., in a local neighborhood.
Over the last decade, the q-composite scheme has received much interest in the literature [3] - [5] , [25] , [26] . However, there is a lack of rigorous analysis on connectivity in secure sensor networks operating under the q-composite scheme with practical transmission constraints; these constraints reflect real-world implementations of sensor networks in which two sensors have to be within a certain distance from each other to communicate. Most connectivity results [4] , [5] , [8] , [26] , [27] on the q-composite scheme unrealistically assume unconstrained sensor-to-sensor communications; i.e., any two sensors can communicate regardless of the distance between them. For the other few studies [9] , [25] that take into account transmission constraints, they fail to provide any rigorous results.
This paper closes the above gap by rigorously deriving the conditions to ensure connectivity in secure sensor networks operating under the q-composite scheme with transmission constraints. Furthermore, we extend the analysis to consider the unreliability of wireless links by modeling each link being independently active with some probability (this probability is assumed to be the same for all links to carry out the analysis). Communication links between nodes may be unreliable due to the presence of physical barriers in between or because of harsh environmental conditions severely impairing transmis-sion. Our results provide useful guidelines for dimensioning the q-composite scheme and adjusting sensor transmission power to ensure secure and reliable connectivity.
All of our results on network connectivity are in the asymptotically probabilistic sense and we use the term "with high probability" defined as follows: in this paper, an event happens with high probability if its probability converges to 1 as n denoting the number of sensors approaches infinity. We briefly summarize our results as follows, and present more details in Section III. For an n-size secure sensor network employing the q-composite scheme under the disk model with/without link unreliability,
• if the network is deployed on a torus of unit area without the boundary effect, then the network becomes securely connected with high probability when the probability that two sensors have a secure link in between is at least c ln n n for some constant c > 1, and • if the network is deployed on a square of unit area with the boundary effect, then the network becomes securely connected with high probability when the probability that two sensors have a secure link in between is at least c ln n n for some constant c > 4. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe the system model. Section III presents some theorems as the main results and discuss the theorems. Afterwards, we establish the theorems in Section IV. We provide a discussion in Section V and numerical experiments in Section VI. Section VII reviews related work, and Section VIII concludes the paper. The Appendix contains a few additional proofs.
II. SYSTEM MODELS
We explain our system models below.
A. The q-Composite Scheme
In the q-composite scheme [9] for secure sensor networks, before deployment, each sensor is assigned K n keys selected uniformly at random from the same key pool containing P n keys. These K n keys constitute a sensor's key ring. Then after deployment, only if two sensors share at least q keys (these are called initial keys) in their key rings, they are able to establish secure communication over an existing link since the generation of a link key is enforced to require at least q initial keys. As an example, after two neighboring sensors find out their shared keys k 1 , k 2 , . . . , k s (being "neighboring" means that the two sensors are within the transmission range r n as detail below), if s ≥ q, the two neighboring sensors can use some hash function H(·) to generate H(k 1 ||k 2 . . . ||k s ) as the key used for secure communication on the link between them; if s < q, the q-composite scheme does not allow the two neighboring sensors to generate link keys.
B. Transmission Constraints under the Disk Model, and Node Distribution
We use the well-known disk model as the transmission constraints, the same as in many analyses [14] , [16] - [18] , [24] on wireless networks. In the disk model, each node's transmission area is a disk with a transmission radius r n , with r n being a function of n for generality, where n is the number of nodes. Two nodes have to be within r n (their distance is at most r n ) for direct communication.
As for the node distribution, the same as much previous work [14] , [16] - [18] , [24] , we consider that the n nodes are independently and uniformly deployed in some network region A. We let the region A be either a torus T or a square S, each with a unit area. The unit torus T eliminates the boundary effect (a node on T "exits" the area from one side appears as reentering from the opposite side). The boundary effect of the unit square S is that a circle with radius r n centered a point near the boundary of S may have a part falling outside of S, so a node close to one side and another node close to the opposite side may not have an edge in between on the square S, but may do on the torus T because of wrap-around connections on the torus topology.
For simplicity, when referring to the disk model in this paper, we always implicitly consider the uniform node distribution.
C. Link Unreliability
Communication links between nodes may not be available due to the presence of physical barriers between nodes or because of harsh environmental conditions severely impairing transmission. To model unreliable links, each link is either active with probability t n or inactive with probability (1−t n ), where t n is a function of n for generality. Table I summarizes the symbols and their meanings.
D. Studied Networks
In view of the above, we study the following four kinds of secure sensor networks: (a) a secure sensor network that employs the q-composite scheme, and works under the disk model on a unit torus, (b) a secure sensor network that employs the q-composite scheme, and works under the disk model on a unit square, (c) a secure sensor network that employs the q-composite scheme, and works under the disk model on a unit torus, and works under the link unreliability model, and (d) a secure sensor network that employs the q-composite scheme, and works under the disk model on a unit square, and works under the link unreliability model. For notation brevity, we will also denote the four networks (a) (b) (c) and (d) above by network , respectively. Given the q-composite scheme and the disk model, in secure sensor networks employing the q-composite scheme under the disk model, two sensors have a secure link in between if and only if (i) they share at least q keys in their key rings, and (ii) they have a distance no greater than r n . However, the secure links in (c) and (d) might be inactive because of link unreliability, while the links are assumed always being reliable in the networks (a) and (b) above. In consideration of the graph topologies of the networks, for each of networks (a) and (b), we say that two sensors have an edge in between in the corresponding graph if they have a secure link in between in the network; for networks (c) and (d), we say that two sensors have an edge in between in the corresponding graph if in the network they have a secure link in between and also such secure link is active. The graph models of these networks will be discussed in detail later in Section IV-A for proving our connectivity results.
Throughout the paper, q is an arbitrary positive integer and does not scale with n, the number of sensors in a sensor network. In addition, ln is the natural logarithm function, the base of which is e. All limits are taken with n → ∞. We use the standard asymptotic notation O(·), o(·), Ω(·), ω(·), Θ(·), ∼; in particular, for two positive sequences x n and y n , the relation x n ∼ y n signifies lim n→∞ (x n /y n ) = 1.
III. MAIN RESULTS
For the four settings of secure sensor networks in Section II-D, we present connectivity results in the following four theorems. Recall that the networks (a) (b) (c) and (d) 
then the network is securely connected with high probability, under conditions
Pn n and r n = o(1). 
then the network is securely and reliably connected with high probability, under conditions
Pn n and r n = o(1).
Theorem 4 (Connectivity of network
q-composite disk model on a unit square unreliable links ). Consider a secure sensor network that employs the qcomposite scheme with K n as the key ring size and P n as the key pool size, and works under the disk model on a unit square so that all sensors are uniformly and randomly distributed on a unit square and two sensors have to be within distance r n for communication, and works under the link unreliability model so that each wireless link is active with probability t n and inactive with probability with (1 − t n ). If
B. Interpretation of Theorem Results
Below we interpret the theorem results. To begin with, clearly all conditions in the theorems only need to hold for all n sufficiently large since all results are in the asymptotic sense (i.e., the case of n → ∞). In the theorems, we omit the phrase "for all n sufficiently large" for simplicity. For convenience, we will use Λ to denote the set of conditions K n = ω(ln n),
Pn n and r n = o(1). Note that all four theorems use the condition set Λ (we will discuss the practicality of Λ later). We now explain the theorems all have conditions on the asymptotics of the edge probabilities, where the edge probability is the probability that two nodes have an edge in between (note that for each network, nodes are all symmetric, so the edge probability is the same for any node pair). We will show the following. ① In Theorem 1, for network q-composite disk model on a unit torus , the term
Pn q ·πr n 2 asymptotically equals the edge probability under the condition set Λ. ② In Theorem 2, for network q-composite disk model on a unit square , the term
Pn q ·πr n 2 asymptotically equals the edge probability under the condition set Λ. ③ In Theorem 3, for network q-composite disk model on a unit torus unreliable links , the term
Pn q · πr n 2 · t n asymptotically equals the edge probability under the condition set Λ.
④ In Theorem 4, for network
q-composite disk model on a unit square unreliable links , the term
Pn q · πr n 2 · t n asymptotically equals the edge probability under the condition set Λ. To prove the above four results on the edge probabilities, we use p q to denote the probability that two sensors have at least q keys in their key rings. We have computed p q in [27, Lemma 2] and obtained
(the details are not repeated here for simplicity), where the relation "∼" means asymptotic equivalence as defined before. Recalling that A denotes the network area and A is either a unit torus T or a unit square S, we then define µ n (A) as the probability that two nodes are within the transmission range r n . For A being the unit torus T , we have µ n (T ) = πr n 2 , since the transmission area of a node has πr n 2 and nodes are all uniformly distributed (note that πr n 2 < 1 for all n sufficiently large since r n = o(1) always holds). For A being the unit square S, we explain below that
. On the unit square S, for the position of a node x satisfying the condition that x's distance to each edge of the unit square is at least r n , given the position of x, the probability that another node y falls in x's transmission area is πr n 2 ; and for the position of x not satisfying the above condition, the probability that y falls in x's transmission area is upper bounded by πr n 2 . Then it holds
Then as explained before, we further use r n = o(1) to derive that πr n 2 is an asymptotic value of µ n (S).
For two nodes, the event that they share at least q keys in their key rings, the event that they are within distance r n , and the event that the link between them is active given the existence of a link, are all mutually independent. Therefore, the edge probabilities in the four networks network , are p q · µ n (T ), p q · µ n (S), p q ·µ n (T )·t n , and p q ·µ n (S)·t n , respectively. As explained, under the condition set Λ, we get
and µ n (S) ∼ πr n 2 , where the relation "∼" defined before means asymptotic equivalence. Then clearly the results ①, ②, ③ and ④ above all follow.
C. Comparing (1) and (2), and Comparing (3) and (4)
In each of Theorems 2 and 4 where the network area is the unit square S, we have presented different conditions on the asymptotics of the edge probabilities: Theorem 2 has (1) and (2), and Theorem 4 has (3) and (4). In the proofs later of Theorems 2 and 4, we will use (2) and (4). We explain below that (1) implies (2) for all n sufficiently large, and (3) implies (4) for all n sufficiently large. Hence, the result in Theorem 2 under the weaker condition (2) implies the result in Theorem 2 under the stronger condition (1); similarly, the result in Theorem 4 under the weaker condition (4) implies the result in Theorem 2 under the stronger condition (3). We put (1) and (3) in Theorems 2 and 4 because their right hand sides are cleaner and easier to understand than those of (2) and (4) .
To show that (1) implies (2) for all n sufficiently large, due to c 4 > 1 for c > 4, it suffices to prove under the conditions of Theorem 2 that for all n sufficiently large,
From (1) and r n = o(1) in the conditions of Theorem 2, it follows that
Pn q = ω ln n n . We define a n as
Pn q · n ln n . Then a n = ω(1) follows from
Pn q = ω ln n n . We further have for all n sufficiently large,
which yields for all n sufficiently large,
Then (5) clearly follows for all n sufficiently large. To show that (3) implies (4) for all n sufficiently large, due to c 4 > 1 for c > 4, it suffices to prove under the conditions of Theorem 4 that for all n sufficiently large,
From (3) and r n = o(1) in the conditions of Theorem 4, it follows that
Pn q ·t n = ω ln n n . We define b n as
Pn q · t n = ω ln n n . We further have for all n sufficiently large,
Then (7) clearly follows for all n sufficiently large.
D. Practicality of Theorem Conditions
We explain that all conditions in the theorems are practical. Note that the key ring size K n is the number of keys assigned to each sensor before deployment. In real-world implementations, K n is often larger [25] , [26] than ln n, so K n = ω(ln n) follows. As concrete examples, we have ln 1000 ≈ 6.9, ln 5000 ≈ 8.5 and ln 10000 ≈ 9.2. Since K n is much smaller compared to both n and P n due to constrained memory and computational resources of sensors [9] , [12] , [25] , then
Pn n } together imply P n = ω(n ln n), which is also practical since P n is larger than n [9] , [12] , [25] . As examples, we have 1000 ln 1000 ≈ 6907, 5000 ln 5000 ≈ 42585 and 10000 ln 10000 ≈ 92103. Finally, because we consider a unit area of network region and there are n nodes in this region, the condition r n = o(1) (i.e., r n → 0 as n → ∞) is also practical.
IV. ESTABLISHING THE THEOREMS

A. Random Graph Modeling of the Studied Networks
A uniform random q-intersection graph induced by the qcomposite scheme. We use G q (n, K n , P n ) to denote the graph topology induced by the q-composite scheme. This graph is known as a uniform random q-intersection graph [5] , [27] in the literature, and is constructed on a node set with size n as follows. Each node is independently assigned a set of K n different keys, selected uniformly at random from a pool of P n keys. An edge exists between two nodes if and only if they have at least q keys in common.
A random geometric graph induced by the disk model with the uniform node distribution. The disk model with the uniform node distribution induces a so-called random geometric graph G RGG (n, r n , A), which is defined as follows. Let n nodes be uniformly and independently deployed in a network area A. An edge exists between two nodes if and only if their distance is no greater than r n .
An Erdős-Rényi graph induced by unreliable links. With each link being active with probability t n and inactive with probability (1 − t n ), the link unreliability yields an Erdős-Rényi graph G ER (n, t n ).
Graph intersections. With the graphs defined above, we obtain that the graph topologies of the four studied networks in Theorems 1-4 are all given by the graph intersections, where the intersection of two graphs G 1 and G 2 defined on the same node set has the following meaning: two nodes have an edge in between in G 1 ∩ G 2 if and only if these two nodes have an edge in G 1 and also have an edge in G 2 . Then we have the following lemma.
Lemma 1. The following results hold.
• The graph topology of network q-composite disk model on a unit torus is G q (n, K n , P n ) ∩ G RGG (n, r n , T ).
• The graph topology of network q-composite disk model on a unit square is G q (n, K n , P n ) ∩ G RGG (n, r n , S).
• The graph topology of network q-composite disk model on a unit torus unreliable links is G q (n, K n , P n ) ∩ G RGG (n, r n , T ) ∩ G ER (n, t n ).
• The graph topology of network q-composite disk model on a unit square unreliable links
Proof: To prove the lemma, we take the network network q-composite disk model on a unit torus as an example. For other networks, the reasoning is similar and is not repeated. In the graph topology of network q-composite disk model on a unit torus , two nodes have an edge in between if and only if the following two events both happen: (a) they have at least q keys in common in their key rings, and (b) their distance is at most r n . Since event (a) is the condition for the two nodes to have an edge in graph G q (n, K n , P n ), and event (b) is the condition for the two nodes to have an edge in graph G RGG (n, r n , T ), it is clear that the graph topology of network q-composite disk model on a unit torus is given by
The idea of establishing Theorems 1-4 is as follows. We will show that under some graph coupling, the graph topology specified in Lemma 1 for each network in Theorems 1-4 is an spanning supergraph 2 of some graph G with high probability, where graph G is connected with high probability under the corresponding conditions; graph coupling associates two random graphs in the same probability space and is formally introduced next.
B. Graph Coupling 1) Definition of a Coupling between Graphs:
Formally, a coupling [17] , [22] , [23] , [29] of two random graphs G 1 and G 2 means a probability space on which random graphs G
., spanning supergraph) G ′ 2 , we say that under the graph coupling, G 1 is a spanning subgraph (resp., spanning supergraph) G 2 .
Following Rybarczyk's notation [22] , we write
if there exists a coupling under which G 1 is a spanning subgraph of G 2 with probability 1 (resp., 1 − o(1)).
In view that connectivity is a monotone increasing graph property, it is natural to obtain that under G 1 G 2 or G 1 1−o(1) G 2 , if G 1 is connected with high probability, then G 2 is also connected with high probability. This result is formally presented in the following lemma given by Rybarczyk [22] . The lemma below considers any monotone increasing graph property for generality, where P[·] means probability.
Lemma 2 (Rybarczyk [22] ). For two random graphs G 1 and G 2 , the following results hold for any monotone increasing graph property I.
Since the topologies of the studied networks are given by graph intersections, we need the following lemma proved by Rybarczyk [22] on the coupling for graph intersections.
Lemma 3 (Rybarczyk [22]). For three random graphs
G 1 , G 2 and G 3 , if G 1 1−o(1) G 2 , then G 1 ∩ G 3 1−o(1) G 2 ∩ G 3 .
2) Couplings for Graphs Modeling the Studied Networks:
With the graph topologies of the studied networks given in Lemma 1, and the introduction of graph coupling above, we now find the couplings for graphs modeling the studied networks. As given by Lemma 4 below, for each studied network on an area A (A is the unit torus T or the unit square S), we show that its topology is an spanning supergraph of some graph G(n, p n , r n , A) with high probability. Graph G(n, p n , r n , A) is constructed as follows. Let n nodes be uniformly and independently deployed in some network area A, which is either a unit torus T or a unit square S. First, two nodes need to have a distance of no greater than r n to have an edge in between, which models the transmission constraints of nodes in wireless networks. Then each edge between two nodes is deleted with probability p n , which models the link unreliability of wireless links. Then it is clear that graph G(n, p n , r n , A) is the intersection of random geometric graph G RGG (n, r n , A) and Erdős-Rényi graph G ER (n, p n ).
Lemma 4. The following results hold under
• The graph topology of network q-composite disk model on a unit torus is a spanning supergraph of G(n,
with high probability.
• The graph topology of network q-composite disk model on a unit torus unreliable links is a spanning supergraph of G(n,
Pn q ·t n ·[1−o(1)], r n , T ) with high probability.
• The graph topology of network q-composite disk model on a unit square is a spanning supergraph of G(n,
• The graph topology of network q-composite disk model on a unit square unreliable links is a spanning supergraph of G(n,
Pn q ·t n ·[1 − o(1)], r n , S) with high probability. Proof: To establish Lemma 4, we couple graph G q (n, K n , P n ) with some Erdős-Rényi graph in Lemma 5, which is given after this proof of Lemma 4. Then from Lemmas 3 and 5, we obtain
, and
Then the proof of Lemma 4 is completed. As mentioned, Lemma 5 presents a graph coupling between G q (n, K n , P n ) and an Erdős-Rényi graph.
Lemma 5. If
To prove Lemma 5, we introduce an auxiliary graph called a binomial random q-intersection graph H q (n, s n , P n ) [3] , [5] , [6] defined later. We couple graph G q (n, K n , P n ) with a binomial random q-intersection graph in Lemma 6 below, while we couple a binomial random q-intersection graph with an Erdős-Rényi graph in Lemma 7 below. Lemma 5 is proved using Lemmas 6 and 7. A binomial random q-intersection graph H q (n, s n , P n ) is constructed on n nodes by the following process. There exists a key pool of size P n . Each key in the pool is added to each node independently with probability s n . Clearly, the difference between a binomial random q-intersection graph H q (n, s n , P n ) and a uniform random q-intersection graph G q (n, K n , P n ) is that in H q (n, s n , P n ), the number of keys assigned to each node obeys a binomial distribution with P n as the number of trials, and with s n as the success probability in each trial, while in G q (n, K n , P n ), such number equals K n with probability 1. Lemma 6. If K n = ω(ln n) and K n = o √ P n , with s n set by
then it holds that
Lemma 7. If s n P n = ω(ln n), ns n = o(1), P n s n 2 = o(1) and n 2 s n 2 P n = ω(1), then there exits some p n satisfying
such that Erdős-Rényi graph G ER (n, p n ) [11] obeys
Among Lemmas 5-7, Lemma 7 associating a binomial random q-intersection graph with an Erdős-Rényi graph has the most involved proof and stands out as one of our contributions. For the proof of Lemma 7, its main part is presented later in Section IV-E, with some computations given in Appendix C. Lemmas 5 and 6 are proved in Appendix A and Appendix B.
In view of Lemma 4, to obtain the connectivity results of the studied networks, we will use the connectivity results of G(n, p n , r n , A), the intersection of a random geometric graph and an Erdős-Rényi graph.
C. Connectivity Results in the Intersection of a Random Geometric Graph and an Erdős-Rényi Graph
Connectivity results of G(n, p n , r n , A) have been recently derived by Penrose [19] . In the lemma below, we write Penrose's results in a form that is convenient for our use. [19] in a more usable form). The following results hold.
Lemma 8 (Presenting the results of Penrose
• Under r n = o(1), graph G(n, p n , r n , T ) is connected with high probability if p n · πr n 2 ≥ c ln n n for all n sufficiently large, with a constant c > 1.
• Under r n = o(1), graph G(n, p n , r n , S) is connected with high probability if p n · πr n 2 ≥ c max{ln 
D. Establishing Theorems 1-4 by Lemmas 4 and 8
We use Lemma 8 to obtain the connectivity results of different graphs G(n, p n , r n , A) in Lemma 4. With p n denoting some p n · [1 − o (1) (15) and (16) 
In addition, from p n /p n = 1 − o(1) and constant c/c < 1, we obtain for all n sufficiently large that
Finally, we complete proving result (ii) above by deriving from (17) and (18) that for all n sufficiently large, (1)], r n , T ) is connected with high probability if (1)], r n , S) is connected with high probability if 
Furthermore, the results (C) and (D) can be simplified as (C') and (D') below (the idea is also to find the connections between conditions, in a way similar to the results (i) and (ii) above; the details are omitted here for simplicity).
(C') Graph G(n,
, r n , S) is connected with high probability if
Together with Lemma 4 (we will explain that conditions in Lemma 4 all hold), the above results (A) (B) (C') (D') complete proving Theorems 1-4, since any spanning supergraph of a graph that is connected with high probability is also connected with high probability.
We now show that conditions in Lemma 4 all hold. First, in Theorems 1-4, we have
Pn n } and r n = o(1). Therefore, all conditions in Lemma 4 will hold once we prove 
E. Proof of Lemma 7
In binomial random q-intersection graph H q (n, P n , s n ), let V i be the set of sensors assigned with key κ i from the key pool (i = 1, 2, . . . , P n ). V i denoting the cardinality of V i (i.e., V i := |V i |) obeys a binomial distribution Bin(n, s n ), with n as the number of trials, and s n as the success probability in each trial. Clearly, we can generate the random set V i in the following equivalent manner: First draw the cardinality V i from the distribution Bin(n, s n ), and then choose V i distinct nodes uniformly at random from the set V of all nodes.
Given V i introduced above, we define below random graph H(V i ) on node set V: H(V i ) is constructed by establishing edges between any and only pair of nodes in V i ; i.e., H(V i ) has a clique on V i and no edges between nodes outside of this clique. If a realization of the random variable V i satisfies V i < 2, then the corresponding H(V i ) will be an empty graph.
We now explain the connection between H(V i ) and the binomial random q-intersection graph H q (n, P n , s n ). We let an operator O q take a multigraph [21] with possibly multiple edges between two nodes as its argument. The operator returns a simple graph with an undirected edge between two nodes i and j, if and only if the input multigraph has at least q edges between these nodes. Recall that two nodes in H q (n, P n , s n ) need to share at least q keys to have an edge in between. Then, with H(V 1 ), . . . , H(V Pn ) generated independently, it is straightforward to see
with = st denoting statistical equivalence. We now introduce auxiliary random graphs L(n, X) and L q (n, X), both defined on the n-size node set V, where X is a non-negative random integer variable. Note that X can also be a fixed value with probability 1. We sample X node pairs with repetition from all pairs of V (a pair is unordered). In graph L(n, X) (resp., L q (n, X)), two nodes have an edge in between if and only if the node pair is sampled at least once (resp., q times).
With H(V i ) and L(n, X) given above, we show a coupling below under which random graph L(n, V i /2 ) is a subgraph of random graph H(V i ); i.e.,
By definition, graph L(n, V i /2 ) has at most V i /2 edges and thus contains non-isolated nodes with a number (denoted
we construct set V i as the union of the ℓ number non-isolated nodes in L and the rest (V i − ℓ) nodes selected uniformly at random from the rest (n − ℓ) isolated nodes in L. Since graph H(V i ) contains a clique of V i , it is clear that the induced instance of H(V i ) is a supergraph of the instance L of graph L(n, V i /2 ). Then (22) is proved. Now based on L(n, V i /2 ), we construct a graph defined on node set V. We add an edge between two nodes in this graph if and only if there exist at least q different number of i such that the two nodes have an edge in each of these L(n, V i /2 ). By the independence of V i (i = 1, 2, . . . , P n ) and the definition of L q (n, X) above, it is clear that such induced graph is statistically equivalent to L q n,
In view of (21), (22), and (23), we see
where Y is defined via
with
We will provide a lower bound on Y with high probability. By Chebyshev's inequality, it follows that for any φ > 0,
We compute E[Y ] and Var[Y ] and have the following results (27) and (28), which are proved in Appendix C. We have
and
where the last step in (28) uses the condition n 2 s n 2 P n = ω(1). Now based on (27) and (28), we select
which with (27) and (28) results in φ = ω(1) and hence
Let Z be a Poisson random variable with mean
With ψ defined by
from (28) (31) and (32), we conclude that ψ = ω(1) and
From ψ = o √ λ , then for all n sufficiently large, we have
2λ (derived from a Taylor expansion), which is used in (33) to yield
Applying ψ = ω(1) and ψ = o √ λ to (34), we obtain
From (29) (31) and (32), we establish
Given (30) (35) and (36), we use the union bound to obtain
Given (37), by the definition of graph L q (n, X), it is easy to construct a coupling such that L q (n, Z) is a subgraph of L q (n, Y ) with probability 1 − o(1); namely,
From [13, Proof of Claim 1], for a Poisson random variable Z with mean λ, in sampling Z node pairs with repetition from all pairs of an n-size node set, the number of draws of different pairs are independent Poisson random variables with mean
Thus, L q (n, Z) with Z following a Poisson distribution with mean λ is an Erdős-Rényi graph [11] in which each edge independently appears with a probability that a Poisson random variable with mean µ is at least q, i.e., a probability of
In view that L q (n, Z) is equivalent to G ER (n, ̺ n ), then from (24) and (38), it follows that
which is exactly (14) in the statement of Lemma 7. Therefore, to prove Lemma 7, we now show that ̺ n defined in (40) satisfies (40) can be bounded by
From (28) (31) (39), and conditions n 2 s n 2 P n = ω(1) and P n s n 2 = o(1), it follows that
Using (43) in (42), we obtain
From [22, Fact 3] , for Erdős-Rényi graphs G ER (n, p
. Therefore, by (41) (44) and [23, Fact 3] on the transitivity of graph coupling, we can set
V. DISCUSSION
A. Results for No Connectivity or Exact Prob. of Connectivity
Our results in this paper are all about parameter conditions to ensure network connectivity with high probability. It is also interesting to derive conditions under which a network is disconnected with high probability. Clearly, if there exists an isolated node, the network or the graph is disconnected. Hence, to derive conditions for no connectivity, we study conditions for the existence of an isolated node (in addition, for many graphs such as Erdős-Rényi graphs and random geometric graphs, the thresholds for connectivity and for the existence of an isolated node are shown to coincide [11] , [14] ). To prove results on node isolation, a common approach is to apply the method of moments and compute the moments of the number of isolated nodes. Due to the space limitation, is connected as a function of the key ring size K with q = 2, the node size n = 1, 000, the key pool size P = 10, 000, and the transmission range r = 0.2 or r = 0.3.
we do not present results on no connectivity in this paper. A future direction is to derive these results. Furthermore, it is also useful to obtain the asymptotically exact probability of connectivity; i.e., for any given probability p between 0 and 1 (including 0 and 1), to derive the conditions under which the network is asymptotically connected with such probability p.
B. Mobility
Our studied networks are all static. A future direction is to consider mobile networks as follows. On the torus, suppose we consider any homogenous mobility model, which means that the movements of all sensors obey the same probability distribution; examples of homogenous mobility models include i.i.d. mobility, random walk mobility, and random waypoint mobility (see Camp et al. [7] for the detailed definitions). On the square, suppose we consider i.i.d. mobility model. Therefore, for all mobile networks considered above, the overall node distribution at each time slot is uniform, although the position of each particular node may change over time. Then we can view each mobile network at a single time slot as the corresponding static network and use our results in this paper on the static networks for future analysis. On the square, if we consider some mobility model other than i.i.d. mobility model, the node distribution at some time slot may become non-uniform, which will make the analysis challenging. In fact, Bettstetter et al. [1] show that for random waypoint mobility model on a square, the node distribution becomes stable after some time but such distribution is non-uniform.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We present numerical results of connectivity in secure sensor networks to confirm the theorems. Figure 1 depicts the probability that network q-composite disk model on a unit torus is connected with q = 2. We vary the key ring size K, and set the following parameters: the node size n = 1, 000, the key pool size P = 10, 000, and the transmission range r = 0.2, 0.3. For each pair (K, r), we generate 500 independent samples of the network and record the count that the obtained network is connected. Then we derive the empirical probabilities after dividing the counts by 500. Similarly, in Figure 2 , we plot the probability that network q-composite disk model on a unit square unreliable links is connected with q = 2, the node size n = 1, 000, n = 900, or n = 800, the key pool size P = 10, 000, the transmission is connected as a function of the key ring size K with q = 2, the node size n = 1, 000, n = 900, or n = 800, the key pool size P = 10, 000, the transmission range r = 0.3 and the link unreliability probability t = 0.4.
range r = 0.3 and the link unreliability probability t = 0.4. In view of Theorem 1, we further compute the least K *
ln n n for Figure 1 and satisfying
for Figure  2 , under the corresponding parameters above. The values of K * are as follows: 44 and 29 for the curves r = 0.2 and r = 0.3 respectively in Figure 1 , and 33, 36 and 38 for the curves n = 1, 000, n = 900, and n = 800 respectively in Figure 2 . Thus, we see that the curves generated by numerical experiments are in accordance with the values of K * derived from our theoretical results.
VII. RELATED WORK
Recall that the q-composite scheme with q = 1 reduces to the Eschenauer-Gligor scheme [12] . Connectivity properties of sensor networks with the Eschenauer-Gligor scheme under different communication models are analyzed in the literature [2] , [10] , [16] , [17] , [28] .
The uniform random q-intersection graph has been extensively studied in prior work in terms of various properties, including connectivity [4] , [26] , clustering [6] , giant component [5] , and perfect matching [4] .
Chan and Fekri [8] approximate a uniform random qintersection graph by an Erdős-Rényi graph and thus approximate the sensor network with the q-composite scheme under the disk model as the intersection of an Erdős-Rényi graph and a random geometric graph, in order to obtain connectivity results of the network. However, there is a lack of rigorous argument for this approximation. A formal argument is needed because an Erdős-Rényi graph and a uniform random qintersection graph used to represent the q-composite scheme are quite different; e.g., edges are all independent in the former but are not in the latter [5] , [6] , [26] . By graph coupling, we rigorously bridge these two graphs.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The q-composite key predistribution scheme is of interest and significance as a mechanism to secure communications in wireless sensor networks. We derive the conditions to guarantee network connectivity with high probability, taking into account practical transmission constraints and link unreliability. These results provide design guidelines for secure sensor networks using the q-composite scheme.
APPENDIX A: PROOF OF LEMMA 5
We first explain that given K n = ω max{ln n, √ Pn n } and K n = o min{ √ P n , Pn n } in Lemma 5, all conditions in Lemmas 6 and 7 are true; i.e., K n = ω(ln n), K n = o √ P n , ns n = o(1), P n s n 2 = o(1) and n 2 s n 2 P n = ω(1) all hold, where s n is defined in (11) .
Clearly, from conditions K n = ω max{ln n, √ Pn n } and K n = o min{ √ P n , Pn n } , we have K n = ω(ln n), K n = ω √ Pn n , K n = o √ P n , and K n = o Pn n } . Using K n = ω(ln n) in (11) , it follows that
Then we obtain the following. First, (45) and K n = ω √ Pn n together yield ns n = o(1). Second, (45) and K n = o √ P n induce P n s n 2 = lead to n 2 s n 2 P n = ω(1). Therefore, all conditions in Lemmas 6 and 7 hold.
We use p n defined in (13) . By [23, Fact 3] on the transitivity of graph coupling, we use (12) in Lemma 6 and (14) in Lemma 7 to obtain
From (13) and (45), we derive p n = By [5, Lemma 4], if s n P n = ω (ln n), and for all n sufficiently large, K n ≥ s n P n + 3(s n P n + ln n) ln n,
then H q (n, s n , P n ) 1−o(1) G q (n, K n , P n ).
Therefore, the proof of Lemma 6 is completed once we show s n P n = ω (ln n) and (47) with s n defined in (11) . From conditions K n = ω (ln n) and s n = Kn Pn 1 − 3 ln n Kn , we first obtain s n P n = ω (ln n) and then for all n sufficiently large, K n − p n P n + 3(p n P n + ln n) ln n = K n 3 ln n K n − 3 K n 1 − 3 ln n K n + ln n ln n = 3K n ln n − 3 K n + √ ln n √ ln n − 3K n ln n ≥ 3K n ln n − 3K n ln n = 0, where we use K n ≥ ln n for all n sufficiently large (this holds from condition K n = ω (ln n)). Then it is clear that Lemma 6 is proved.
APPENDIX C: ESTABLISHING (27) AND (28) We now prove (27) and (28) based on (25) and (26) . For a random variable R, we denote its expected value (i.e., mean) and variance by E[R] and Var[R], respectively. As noted, V i obeys a binomial distribution Bin(n, s n ). Then 
From (26) 
